Measured business recovery,
not just technical activity.

$4.5 million had already gone into two implementations that never gave Hutton the tools to run the company. Five groups each carried a different construction start date, and the only source of truth was a sprawling spreadsheet guarded by the CEO's right-hand man.

WIP ran weeks off, over and under billings would not reconcile, and a job leadership believed was profitable was quietly bleeding cash. They could not say with confidence which properties they owned or who owed them rent each month.

Nine people gave nine different answers for when a single job started. The reporting was not broken so much as ungoverned: no definition of a start date was owned by anyone, and the Director of Construction, who had the right one, was not the source any system used.

We unified the start date to the one construction actually owned, established governed definitions every system agreed on, and made the prior software spend productive rather than replacing the ERP or CRM.

Provider payments could not be released until the provider was compliant on the back office side, and compliance lived in each staffer's own spreadsheet, every one with a different checklist. Sixty developers sat on payroll with no single system to run any of it on.

Approved money sat still while staff chased missing documents by phone and email, one provider at a time. Every week of delay was a provider waiting to be paid and a compliance record the plan could not audit.

The failure was process, not software. No shared definition of provider compliance existed, so every requirement had been re-invented privately and none of it could be enforced or reported on.

We mapped every compliance requirement into predictable if-then workflow, built it into a new Dynamics CRM, and gave providers an external portal with wizard-driven questionnaires and document upload so they could complete compliance themselves.

Two enterprise global Dynamics implementations had already failed, both run by the same top-tier Microsoft partner. Then the CEO resigned, the incoming CFO ordered every third-party vendor fired, and the IT Director began ending contracts one by one.

Thirteen countries were still operating without the single Sales, CRM, and Field Service platform two attempts had promised, and the third attempt was about to lose its remaining delivery partner.

The prior failures were not a platform problem. The work had been sold and staffed by a partner who was never close enough to operations to know what the business actually ran on.

We kept the global rollout moving through the vendor purge and built the automation and integration layer underneath it, plus Field Service live across Europe.

The CRM was full and nobody worked it. The sales side had been built wrong from day one, reps were never trained properly, and none of them said so out loud.

$220 million in opportunity aged quietly for eighteen months, including 121 inquiries from their own website nobody ever touched. Leadership forecast off numbers that were never real, and monthly reporting to the C-suite was fudged to match.

Not negligence. Reps kept personal spreadsheets because follow-up lived somewhere the system could not reach, so deals entered the CRM and then dropped out of anyone's working view.

We rebuilt the process and the procedures alongside the CRM itself so follow-up could no longer hide, then brought the oldest opportunities back into an actively worked pipeline.